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LEGAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS 
IN ADOLESCENTS’ END-OF-LIFE CHOICES 
Molly J. Walker Wilson* 
INTRODUCTION 
Each year, thousands of children face life-threatening illness or injury. 
Many of the parents of these children must grapple with gut-wrenching 
decisions concerning treatment options. When the child is older, she may 
have her own ideas about the best course of treatment, and these ideas may 
conflict with those of her parents.1 For the most part, such disagreements 
are resolved privately. In cases where the wishes of the parent and child are 
firmly at odds, medical professionals, legislators, and courts face complex 
questions about the appropriate role of a mature minor in decisions about 
her treatment at the end of life.2 
Several developments, including the common law “rule of sevens” 
and “mature minor doctrine,” include consideration of a minor’s 
preferences, provided that certain conditions are met.3 Each includes the 
notion that as a child approaches the age of majority, she becomes 
increasingly capable of making thoughtful, well-informed decisions. 
Today, state courts in a number of jurisdictions across the United States 
have held that a person under the age of eighteen can demonstrate the 
capacity for independent judgment by meeting certain criteria.4 The 
Supreme Court acknowledged the legitimacy of this approach in Bellotti v. 
Baird, a 1979 opinion requiring states to provide an option for making such 
a showing in the limited case of minors seeking an abortion without 
parental consent.5 However, despite the fact that courts in some states have 
provided an avenue for mature minors to weigh in, deference to parents’ 
 
*  Associate Professor of Law and Associate Professor of Psychology, Saint Louis University. I am 
indebted to Jesse Goldner, Elizabeth Pendo, and other members of the health law faculty at Saint Louis 
University Law School for helpful suggestions on an early draft of this article. I am also grateful to 
members of the Michigan State University Journal of Medicine and Law, who invited me to present this 
paper at their annual symposium in 2014.  
1  Note, though, that capacity varies a great deal, as discussed infra Part II.  
2  See Committee on Bioethics, Informed Consent, Parental Permission, and Assent in Pediatric 
Practice, 95 PEDIATRICS 314, 314 (1995)(“Although physicians should seek parental permission in 
most situations, they must focus on the goal of providing appropriate care and be prepared to seek legal 
intervention when parental refusal places the patient at clear and substantial risk. In cases of serious 
conflict, physicians and families should seek consultative assistance and only in rare circumstances look 
to judicial determinations.”) (citing John D. Lantos, Treatment Refusal, Noncompliance, and the 
Pediatrician’s Responsibilities, 18 PEDIATRIC ANNALS 255 (1989)) [http://perma.cc/PH2M-W3W7]. 
3  See infra notes 41–45 and accompanying text. 
4  Id. 
5  See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979) [http://perma.cc/JEL5-7FGW]. 
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choices remains the norm. While the informal practice of many medical 
professionals is to include the minor in medical decisionmaking, there is no 
legal obligation to do so.6 The current legal default of parental choice risks 
leaving the child out of the process.7 
Clearly, not all minors are good decisionmakers. Research reveals 
cognitive and behavioral differences between adolescents and adults. 
Adolescent brains are not fully developed,8 and teens engage in more risk-
taking and are particularly prone to social influence.9 These factors are 
worthy of consideration. However, adults also exhibit irrational behavior, 
and may be particularly subject to cognitive biases when dealing with a 
critically ill child. The over-optimism bias, probability neglect, 
confirmation bias, and availability heuristic are empirically demonstrated 
decisional biases that, while often adaptive, can influence choice in a way 
that leads to suboptimal decisions.10 In particular, these biases may work 
together to influence parents to choose more drastic, potentially invasive 
therapies that the child may prefer to avoid. The singular focus on the 
limits of adolescents’ capacity ignores the fact that parents are also limited 
in their ability to make rational choices. In this Essay, I argue that parents 
and children make the best decisions when they work together, with the 
assistance of a bioethical mediator. When the choices of the parent and 
child are in conflict, a bioethical mediator trained to recognize and 
neutralize the limitations and biases of all parties can increase the chances 
of an optimal outcome. 
The first Part of this Essay will discuss the basis for the framework of 
parental deference in the context of adolescent medical decisionmaking. 
This Part will also briefly discuss the role of the state as parens patriae, 
and the power and limitation of the state in that role. The second Part of 
this Essay will address the limitations of adolescent decisionmaking from a 
behavioral, developmental, and brain science perspective, while also 
discussing how the law treats adolescents. The third Part of the Essay will 
focus on the cognitive biases that can impede optimal choice formation for 
adults. Finally, the fourth Part of the Essay will advocate the use of a 
 
6  For example, the Committee on Bioethics has written, “Parents and physicians should not 
exclude children and adolescents from decisionmaking without persuasive reasons.” See Committee on 
Bioethics, supra note 2. 
7  See Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Whose Body Is It Anyway? An Updated Model of Healthcare 
Decision-Making Rights for Adolescents, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 251, 257 (2005) (“For most 
adolescents, in most circumstances, this period of being in between leaves them stranded in the midst of 
a legal system in which ‘even older children are permitted to decide very little for themselves.’”) 
(quoting Carol Sanger & Eleanor Willemsen, Minor Changes: Emancipating Children in Modern 
Times, 25 U. MICH J.L. REFORM 239, 244 (1992)). 
8  See The Teen Brain: Still Under Construction, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
http://www.nimh.nih.gov/health/publications/the-teen-brain-still-under-construction/index.shtml (last 
visited Mar. 27, 2015) (reporting differences in the adult and adolescent brain) [http://perma.cc/7BUZ-
R2NT]. 
9  See Elizabeth S. Scott, The Legal Construction Of Childhood, in A CENTURY OF JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, at 115 (Margaret K. Rosenheim et al. eds., 2002). 
10  See infra Part III. 
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bioethical mediator both to assist the parties in reaching a compromise and 
to prevent the breakdown of the supportive parent–child relationship that 
can be so beneficial for the terminally ill adolescent patient. 
I. LEGAL BASIS FOR PARENTAL MEDICAL DECISIONMAKING 
The current legal landscape is a function of the traditional role of 
parents and the prominence of parental rights. It is also a result of court 
decisions and state statutes. There are two primary bases for the parental 
decisionmaking model. The first is a rights-based approach. This 
framework conceives of the right to parent as a fundamental right, 
tantamount to the right to marry and other rights.11 The second is a best-
interest-of-the-child approach. This rationale is rooted in the belief that 
parents are uniquely suited to make wise choices on behalf of their children 
because of their knowledge of and affection for their children.12 
A. Parenting as a Basic Right 
There are at least two reasons why the right to bear and raise children 
as one sees fit is a fundamental right. The first is a functional, exchange-
based rationale, namely that rights and responsibility go hand-in-hand. 
Affording parents the right to make decisions about their children is 
necessary because of the myriad responsibilities that parents assume in 
raising children, and fairness requires that the state compensate parents for 
the long hours, hard work, and considerable associated costs involved.13 
The second rationale for strong parental rights is motivational; parents are 
more likely to care for their children when they are given latitude to shape 
the character of the child and the child’s destiny.14 Conversely, parents who 
are denied opportunities to shape their children are less willing to make 
investments in their children.15 
The rights-based approach has also been equated with a second, 
property-like argument. This argument maintains that when a person 
creates another human life, assuming that there is no abdication of that 
relationship right through abuse or neglect, the passing on of one’s genetic 
 
11  See infra Part I.A. 
12  See infra Part I.B. 
13  See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (tying together rights with 
responsibilities) [http://perma.cc/R9AG-LR9T]; Elizabeth S. Scott, Parental Autonomy and Children’s 
Welfare, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1071, 1083 (2003) (discussing the advantages of a parental 
custody model that rewards “investment in child rearing in the intact family with parental status and 
authority after divorce”) [http://perma.cc/G3PS-9WKX]. 
14  The Uniform Parentage Act is an example of a legal structure that incentivizes investment in 
children. Under this Act, a father who resides in the same home as the child for the first two years of the 
child’s life, and openly holds the child as his own, is the presumptive natural father, with rights to the 
child. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT § 204(a)(5) (2002) [http://perma.cc/5LWD-CLTH]. 
15  Cf. Shoshana L. Gillers, Note, A Labor Theory of Legal Parenthood, 110 YALE L.J. 691, 695 
(2001) (describing the requirement that parents “invest emotionally and physically in their children’s 
development” in exchange for maintaining custody of the child) [http://perma.cc/W6K3-8Q87]. 
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material creates a proprietary right in that new life.16 On this basis, parents 
have a proprietary interest in making choices on behalf of their children, 
whose lives they created. 
The Supreme Court of the United States has played a limited role in 
the development of family law, but has spoken to the question of whether 
parenting constitutes a fundamental right. While acknowledging that 
resolution of issues relating to “the family” has traditionally been reserved 
for the various states,17 the Court has provided some guidance in several 
key and oft-cited cases. These cases have, for the most part, articulated and 
justified a framework for parental rights. In Meyer v. Nebraska, the Court 
held that the right of liberty includes the right to engage in the common 
occupations of life, including the right “to marry, establish a home and 
bring up children.”18 The Court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment 
“[w]ithout doubt” included the right to raise children.19 Two years later, in 
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the Court said, “The child is not the mere 
creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the 
right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for 
additional obligations.”20 It was several decades later in Wisconsin v. Yoder 
that the Court asserted that “[t]his primary role of the parents in the 
upbringing of their children is now established beyond debate as an 
enduring American tradition.”21 Most recently, in Troxel v. Granville,22 the 
Supreme Court reiterated that parents have a basic right to raise their 
children. 
B. Parental Control and the Best Interest of the Child 
Another basis for granting parents the right to make decisions on 
behalf of their children is the notion that parents are in a unique position to 
act in the child’s best interest. The Supreme Court articulated this rationale 
for granting parents broad decisionmaking power in Parham v. J.R.23 
 
16  See, e.g., Dutkiewicz v. Dutkiewicz, 957 A.2d 821, 830 (Conn. 2008) (“[The] parent’s interest 
in the care, custody and control over his or her child is a fundamental right.”) [https://perma.cc/7CWZ-
MWQD]; Punsly v. Ho, 105 Cal. Rptr. 2d 139, 144–45 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (asserting that “the 
custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents”) [http://perma.cc/Z7MW-KRZ5]. There 
is a considerable literature pushing back on the child-as-property framework. See generally Kevin 
Noble Maillard, Rethinking Children as Property: The Transitive Family, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 225 
(2010) [http://perma.cc/2ZWU-FC2M]; Barbara Bennett Woodhouse, “Who Owns the Child?”: Meyer 
and Pierce and the Child as Property, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 995 (1992) [http://perma.cc/XW8Y-
UYX3]. Starting in the 1960’s, child advocates began talking about children’s rights. For a brief review 
of this development, see Martin Guggenheim, Maximizing Strategies for Pressuring Adults to Do Right 
by Children, 45 ARIZ. L. REV. 765, 771–774 (2003) [http://perma.cc/32RN-P93A]. 
17  There is a domestic relations exception to federal jurisdiction. See Ankenbrandt ex rel. L.R. v. 
Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 693–701 (1992) [http://perma.cc/AP2M-BTWN]. 
18  262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) [http://perma.cc/L42Z-CV27]. 
19  Id. 
20  268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925) (coupling “rights” with “obligations,” which captures the rights–
responsibility notion). 
21  406 U.S. 205, 232 (1972) [http://perma.cc/KS4P-4JDF]. 
22  530 U.S. 57 (2000) [http://perma.cc/F98Q-U7XK]. 
23  442 U.S. 584, 602–04 (1979) [http://perma.cc/X9HY-FRV3]. 
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Parents generally have knowledge of the particular habits, preferences, and 
reactions of their children.24 Unlike doctors or teachers, and certainly unlike 
judges, parents see their children from birth (or adoption) through the 
years, in a wide range of circumstances, as the child develops and gains a 
variety of experiences. Because of this long-term involvement, the parent 
understands how the child appears to be functioning contemporarily, and 
knows the child’s history. To a great extent, the child’s history is 
intertwined with that of her parents, as happens for those who have a great 
many shared experiences.25 
The parent also has unique insights into the child because the parent 
has helped to shape the child, through the exercise of religious practices, 
the teaching of moral codes, the enforcement of social norms, and the 
fostering of specific social relationships and educational priorities. Parents 
often choose to pass down cultural values and traditions.26 Sometimes 
parents consciously steer their children away from the dominant culture or 
certain aspects of society. The teachings and norms of the parents and the 
family can increase or decrease sensitivity to certain environmental inputs 
and can dramatically alter how a child interprets experiences. As the person 
with the greatest insight into these variables, a parent holds a great deal of 
information relevant to what choices will most benefit a child. 
C. Parens Patriae: The Role of the State 
Any discussion that calls into question the absolute right of a parent to 
make medical decisions for a child generally starts with the notion of 
parens patriae. The Latin phrase parens patriae, literally translated, means 
“parent of the nation.” This doctrine grants the state the right to exercise 
control to protect those citizens who are most vulnerable. When a parent’s 
wishes regarding the treatment of a child conflict with generally accepted 
practices, the state may step in as parens patriae.27 The idea that a parent’s 
 
24  Id. at 601–04. 
25  However, there are times when the courts must be involved. One situation in which an older 
child’s preference sometimes conflicts with that of a parent is with respect to custodial arrangements in 
the event of marital dissolution. Child advocate Judith Wallerstein has argued that with respect to 
custody, courts “should be responsive to the child’s voice, amplifying it above the din of competing 
parents. Only in this way can it ascertain and respect ‘the best interest of the child.’” Judith S. 
Wallerstein & Tony J. Tanke, To Move or Not to Move: Psychological and Legal Considerations in the 
Relocation of Children Following Divorce, 30 FAM. L.Q. 305, 323 (1996). 
26  Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 532, 534–535 (1925); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 
390, 398 (1923). 
27  In order to challenge the parent’s right to make decisions, the state must have the parent 
adjudicated neglectful or the child a “child in need of assistance.” “The statutory definition of child 
neglect varies by state but falls within the range provided by the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment 
Act (CAPTA). CAPTA defines child abuse and neglect as ‘at a minimum, any recent act or failure to 
act on the part of a parent or caretaker, which results in death, serious physical or emotional harm, 
sexual abuse or exploitation, or an act or failure to act which presents an imminent risk of serious 
harm.’” Denise Cohen, Note, Childhood Obesity: Balancing the Nation’s Interest with a Parent’s 
Constitutional Right to Privacy, 10 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 357, 380 (2012) (quoting 
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5106g (1996) [http://perma.cc/GQ9P-RXLX]). 
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choice for her child can be challenged (by anyone, state or child) 
contradicts the common law notion that the parent has property-like rights 
in the child.28 In the 1944 case, Prince v. Massachusetts, the Supreme Court 
famously asserted the limits of parental discretion.29 The Prince decision 
represents an important caveat to the general parental authority. This case 
is invoked when there is a question of the extent to which a parent may 
categorically exclude the state from intrusion into the private sphere of 
family life. 
II. DEFINING THE SCOPE OF ADOLESCENT CHOICE 
As the Prince decision makes clear, children are protected by the U.S. 
Constitution and the various state statutes, but they are protected in a 
different way than are adults. Children, unless they are emancipated, are 
presumed not to have the life experience or cognitive ability to make good 
decisions for themselves.30 Courts and lawmakers use several justifications 
for this policy. One justification is that adolescents’ bodies and brains are 
not fully developed, which may impair decisionmaking. Adolescents likely 
lack an ability to financially support themselves; indeed, child labor laws 
have severely limited opportunities available to children to earn a wage.31 
Minors also possess limited life experience and knowledge, and remain 
relatively susceptible to peer pressure and other social influences during 
this period of life. Because of these characteristics of adolescence, the 
parent is still presumptively in charge—meaning that consent derives from 
the parent—until a child attains the age of eighteen. 
A. Brain Development and Maturation Issues in Adolescence 
Proponents of parental control over medical care for minors cite a 
number of biological and social factors supporting a default to parental 
decisionmaking. Some research indicates that adolescents may lack the 
capacity to make optimal decisions about their own medical care. The 
adolescent brain is different from the adult brain in important ways.32 
Moreover, adolescence is a period of life in which the child’s body is still 
developing, new chemicals in the form of hormones flood the bloodstream, 
and new expectations and responsibilities confront the child. The 
 
28  For a discussion of the notion of child as property, see generally, Woodhouse, supra note 16, at 
1036–50. See also Maillard, supra note 16, at 237 (“At common law, children were treated as chattel.”). 
29  Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 170 (1944) (“Parents may be free to become martyrs 
themselves. But it does not follow they are free, in identical circumstances, to make martyrs of their 
children before they have reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that choice 
for themselves.”) [http://perma.cc/Q9VN-E672]. 
30  See generally Sarah-Jayne Blakemore & Suparna Choudhury, Development of the Adolescent 
Brain: Implications for Executive Function and Social Cognition, 47 J. CHILD PSYCHOL. & 
PSYCHIATRY 296 (2006). 
31  See The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, as amended 29 U.S.C. § 212 (2012) 
[http://perma.cc/WN4G-2SPV]. 
32  See generally Kendall Powell, Neurodevelopment: How Does the Teenage Brain Work?, 
442 NATURE 865 (2006). 
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achievement of sexual maturity during this period of life is relatively 
recent, and many adolescents spend a significant portion of these years 
acclimating to physical changes that signal the impending transformation 
from childhood to adulthood. 
Research investigating behavior during this unique time of life has 
revealed certain patterns that bear on decisionmaking. Adolescents are 
particularly susceptible to peer influence.33 They have a tendency to focus 
more on immediate rather than long-term consequences.34 In addition, 
minors are less risk averse and thus more inclined to make risky choices 
than are adults.35 
Investigations involving MRI scans have indicated that the adolescent 
brain may not be fully developed until the age of twenty-one to twenty-
three.36 Importantly, the most evolved parts of the brain—those essential 
for making complex choices—reach maturity last. Research indicates that 
the prefrontal cortex activity necessary for responsible decisionmaking is 
not fully engaged until around twenty-one years of age.37 Complementing 
this research is brain imaging showing that adolescents rely more on 
emotional areas of the brain in making decisions.38 
On the other hand, minors who are approaching adulthood vary 
considerably in their cognitive and reasoning ability. During the 1950s, 
Swiss psychologist Jean Piaget described the process by which adolescents 
reach a stage of formal operational thinking.39 Piaget’s work suggests that 
 
33  Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) [http://perma.cc/QZA4-GZXL]; Elizabeth S. Scott et 
al., Evaluating Adolescent Decision Making in Legal Contexts, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 221, 222 
(1995). 
34  See generally Valerie F. Reyna & Frank Farley, Risk and Rationality in Adolescent Decision 
Making: Implications for Theory, Practice, and Public Policy, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. PUB. INT. 1 (2006) 
[http://perma.cc/P96L-43RY]; Adriana Galvan et al., Risk-Taking and the Adolescent Brain: Who is at 
Risk?, 10 DEVELOPMENTAL SCI. F8 (2007); Valerie F. Reyna et al., Risky Decision Making in 
Childhood and Adolescence: A Fuzzy-Trace Theory Approach, in THE DEVELOPMENT OF JUDGMENT 
AND DECISION MAKING IN CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS, at 77 (Janis E. Jacobs & Paul A. Klaczynski 
eds., 2005). 
35  Scott, supra note33, at 222; see also William Gardner & Janna Herman, Adolescents’ AIDS Risk 
Taking: A Rational Choice Perspective, in ADOLESCENTS IN THE AIDS EPIDEMIC, 17–18 (William 
Gardner et al., eds., 1990). 
36  Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A Longitudinal 
MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861–62 (1999); Elizabeth R. Sowell et al., In Vivo 
Evidence for Post-Adolescent Brain Maturation in Frontal and Striatal Regions, 2 NATURE 
NEUROSCIENCE 859, 861 (1999). 
37  See Sara B. Johnson et al., Adolescent Maturity and the Brain: The Promise and Pitfalls of 
Neuroscience Research in Adolescent Health Policy, 45 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 216, 217 (2009) 
(“Although myelin cannot be measured directly, it is inferred from volumes of cerebral white matter. 
Evidence suggests that, in the prefrontal cortex, this does not occur until the early 20s or later.” 
(citations omitted)) [http://perma.cc/9KS4-LN7Z]. It is telling that this was the traditional age for 
recognizing a person as “of age,” as being a mature decisionmaker. 
38  Abigail A. Baird et al., Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging of Facial Affect Recognition in 
Children and Adolescents, 38 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD & ADOLESCENT PSYCHIATRY 195, 198 (1999) 
[http://perma.cc/LE62-S79S]. 
39  See generally BÄRBEL INHELDER & JEAN PIAGET, THE GROWTH OF LOGICAL THINKING FROM 
CHILDHOOD TO ADOLESCENCE: AN ESSAY ON THE CONSTRUCTION OF FORMAL OPERATIONAL 
STRUCTURES (Anne Parsons & Stanley Milgrim trans., 1958); THE ESSENTIAL PIAGET (Howard E. 
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at least some minors between the ages of fourteen and eighteen may 
possess sufficient cognitive processing capacity and self-knowledge to 
make a fully informed choice. Professor Stephen Ellmann suggests that 
people can exercise free choice when: (1) they know there is a decision to 
be made, and that they have the right to make it; (2) they know the choices 
and the costs and benefits of these choices; and (3) they understand their 
values and emotional needs.40 
B. Flexibility and Minor Decisionmaking 
Like researchers, courts also acknowledge that some adolescents may 
be able to make their own end-of-life choices. Under U.S. law, age 
eighteen, while presumptively the age of majority, is not always a bright 
line. This has long been the case; at common law, the rule of sevens carved 
out different presumptions, depending upon three age ranges.41 According 
to the rule of sevens, minors from birth to age seven had no capacity, 
minors between the ages of seven and fourteen had a rebuttable 
presumption of no capacity, and minors from age fourteen to twenty-one 
had a rebuttable presumption of capacity.42 Those over twenty-one were 
presumed to have full capacity. 
More recently, the mature minor doctrine has created an avenue for 
minors who demonstrate the capacity to make informed decisions to 
exercise some authority over their own medical treatment. The mature 
minor doctrine theoretically can apply in any situation in which a minor is 
seeking to make a decision about medical treatment. In determining 
whether the minor is sufficiently mature to exercise control over treatment 
options, the minor’s capacity is evaluated in order to determine whether the 
minor has: 
(1) an intellectual appreciation of the causal connections between 
one’s choices and the consequences that will likely follow, 
(2) a realistic affective and evaluative capacity to appreciate the 
weight and significance of the risks and benefits, proximate and distant, 
associated with the consequences of one’s choices, and 
(3) a self-determining capacity to choose or to decline to make a 
choice while not being unduly swayed by impulse.43 
 
Gruber & J. Jacques Vonèche eds., 1977); Jean Piaget, Piaget’s Theory, in 1 HANDBOOK OF CHILD 
PSYCHOLOGY 103 (Paul H. Mussen ed., Guy Gellerier & Jonas Langer trans., 4th ed., 1983). While 
Piaget has been influential, his work is not without its detractors. One criticism of Piaget’s stages theory 
is that it is too rigid; children do not necessarily move through the stages at the same ages and in 
discrete steps (a fact that he has acknowledged). 
40  See Stephen Ellmann, Lawyers and Clients, 34 UCLA L. REV. 717, 727–28 (1987). 
41  Cardwell v. Bechtol, 724 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tenn. 1987) [https://perma.cc/S7VF-HX77]. As a 
result of a movement in the late 1960s to link draft age and voting age, the voting age was lowered from 
twenty-one to eighteen. 
42  Id. 
43  See generally COMPETENCY: A STUDY OF INFORMAL COMPETENCY DETERMINATIONS IN 
PRIMARY CARE (Mary Ann Gardell Cutter & Earl E. Shelp eds., 1991); BECKY WHITE, COMPETENCE 
TO CONSENT (1994). See also Mutcherson, supra note 7, at 314 (“The court’s goal should be to 
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The mature minor doctrine holds that where a minor is “of sufficient 
intelligence and maturity to understand and appreciate both the benefits and 
risks of the proposed medical or surgical treatment, then the minor may 
consent to that treatment without parental consent . . . .”44 In Bellotti v. 
Baird, the Supreme Court held that if a state requires minors to obtain 
parental consent to obtain an abortion, it must also allow the minor “to 
show either: (1) that she is mature enough and well enough informed to 
make her abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, 
independently of her parents’ wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to 
make this decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best 
interests.”45 In essence, Bellotti requires a state to apply the mature minor 
doctrine or to make a best-interest determination where abortion is 
concerned. 
A number of state courts have applied the principle, at some points 
providing additional guidance, and at others orienting the doctrine within 
their own state’s legislative and common law framework.46 In Cardwell v. 
Bechtol, for example, the Supreme Court of Tennessee wrote, “The mature 
minor exception is part of the common law of Tennessee. Its application is 
a question of fact for the jury to determine whether the minor has the 
capacity to consent to and appreciate the nature, the risks, and the 
consequences of the medical treatment involved.”47 But the Cardwell court 
cautioned service providers and lower courts not to be overly expansive 
with the doctrine, noting that “[a]doption of the mature minor exceptions to 
the common law rule is by no means a general license to treat minors 
without parental consent and its application is dependent on the facts of 
 
determine whether the adolescent has the capacity for mature and thoughtful decision-making and can 
therefore make a treatment decision that is informed, intelligent, and voluntary. An adolescent would 
need to show that she could articulate her health problem and its consequences as well as indicate an 
understanding of the available treatment options and why she has made a particular decision about that 
treatment.”). For a discussion of the mature minor doctrine, see Melinda T. Derish & Kathleen Vanden 
Heuvel Mature Minors Should Have the Right to Refuse Life-Sustaining Medical Treatment, 28 J.L. 
MED. & ETHICS 109 (2000) [http://perma.cc/E4K7-F6E4]; Jonathan F. Will, My God My Choice: The 
Mature Minor Doctrine and Adolescent Refusal of Life-Saving or Sustaining Medical Treatment Based 
Upon Religious Beliefs, 22 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233 (2006) [http://perma.cc/69WR-
UWG5]. 
44  JAMES MORRISSEY ET AL., CONSENT AND CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE HEALTH CARE OF 
CHILDREN AND ADOLESCENTS: A LEGAL GUIDE 43 (1986); see also Joan-Margaret Kun, Comment, 
Rejecting the Adage “Children Should Be Seen and Not Heard”—The Mature Minor Doctrine, 
16 PACE L. REV. 423 (1996) (discussing the rights of mature minors under state laws and suggesting 
new legislation and guidelines) [http://perma.cc/QE7N-E5GY]. 
45  443 U.S. 622, 643–44 (1979) (footnote omitted). 
46  See, e.g., In re E.G., 549 N.E.2d 322, 327–28 (Ill. 1989) (finding that the mature minor doctrine 
was sufficient grounds for the trial court to hold a minor capable of refusing medical treatment, but that 
there are situations where the minor’s decision must be balanced with other concerns) 
[http://perma.cc/TD3F-TH5R]; In re Green, 307 A.2d 279 (Pa. 1973) (affirming the trial court’s order 
that respected the wishes of an adolescent to decline a spinal operation) [http://perma.cc/9VZN-GY7L]. 
But see Niebla v. County of San Diego, No. 90-56302, 1992 WL 140250, at *4 (9th Cir. June 23, 1992) 
(declining to reverse a dismissal based on the trial court’s refusal to apply the mature minor doctrine in 
a case compelling blood transfusions for a Jehovah’s Witness minor) http://perma.cc/2RLK-FHEY]. 
47  724 S.W.2d 739, 745 (Tenn. 1987). 
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each case.”48 In Belcher v. Charleston Area Medical Center, the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of West Virginia asserted that the national standard of 
care was that a mature minor must be involved in discussions that “affect 
their livelihood.”49 Other courts apply a slight variation on these principles. 
In In re Swan, the Supreme Court of Maine deferred to the wishes of 
seventeen-year-old accident victim who was in a persistent vegetative state 
who had expressed a wish not to be kept alive under those circumstances 
prior to the accident.50 
Legislation has been slow to follow court decisions. For instance, 
when it comes to the formation of legally valid advanced directives, most 
state statutes indicate a “competent adult” or similar (over the age of 
seventeen) requirement.51 New Mexico, which permits capable 
unemancipated minors to make decisions about life-sustaining treatment in 
some circumstances, is a notable exception. 52 
In contrast, other state statutes specifically exclude minors—unless 
they are emancipated—in granting the authority to make such choices. For 
example, a provision of South Carolina’s Death with Dignity (or Right to 
Die) Act permits a person to adopt a written declaration that life-sustaining 
procedures may be withheld, but only if the person is eighteen years of age 
or older.53 
C. Adolescent Autonomy and Importance of Control 
Although adolescents vary in terms of their cognitive maturity, there 
are important reasons to give adolescents a broader voice in their healthcare 
decisionmaking, including recognition of the adolescent’s personal 
autonomy, freedom, and dignity. Gerald Dworkin has noted: 
there is value connected with being self-determining that is not a 
matter either of bringing about good results or the pleasures of the 
process itself. This is the intrinsic desirability of exercising the 
capacity for self-determination. We desire to be recognized by 
 
48  Id. 
49  422 S.E.2d 827, 835 (W. Va. 1992) [http://perma.cc/WAG9-ABSC]. 
50  569 A.2d 1202, 1202–03 (Me. 1990) [http://perma.cc/Z4FT-UWDX]. 
51  For example, the Florida legislature has determined that “every competent adult has the 
fundamental right of self-determination regarding decisions pertaining to his or her own health, 
including the right to choose or refuse medical treatment.” FLA. STAT. ANN. § 765.102(1) (West 2010) 
[http://perma.cc/6PFY-4PFC]. 
52  “Subject to the provisions of Subsection B of this section, if an unemancipated minor has 
capacity sufficient to understand the nature of that unemancipated minor’s medical condition, the risks 
and benefits of treatment and the contemplated decision to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment, that unemancipated minor shall have the authority to withhold or withdraw life-sustaining 
treatment.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24–7A–6.1.C. (Supp. 2013). 
53  S.C. CODE ANN. § 44–77–30 (2002) [http://perma.cc/JND3-FLCS]; see also ALA. CODE § 22-
8A-4 (LexisNexis 2006) (“competent adult”) [http://perma.cc/4BCH-FEZ8]; GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-5 
(West 2010) (“emancipated or 18 years of age or older”) [http://perma.cc/BK7C-XPKA]; N.H. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 137-J:1 (LexisNexis 2012) (“competent person”) [http://perma.cc/QGJ6-HKR3]; N.D. 
CENT. CODE § 23-06.5-01 (2012) (“competent adult”) [http://perma.cc/P2SY-FFRF]; W. VA. CODE 
ANN. § 16-30-4(a) (LexisNexis 2011) (“competent adult”) [http://perma.cc/EY44-FK72]. 
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others as the kind of creature capable of determining our own 
destiny.54 
The feeling of control is an important influence on human behavior.55 
When individuals perceive that they have control over events, they 
experience less fear.56 Conversely, risks over which people perceive that 
they have little influence are likely to be viewed as more dangerous and 
less acceptable.57 The ability to exercise some control over the course of 
serious illness arguably has particular import for the gravely injured or ill 
adolescent who often feels powerless and overwhelmed by her disease or 
injury. 
As one commentator has noted, “[t]he law’s treatment of minors in the 
healthcare context has been scattered and contradictory.”58 The current 
patchwork of court opinions, along with variability in how health care 
providers and hospitals handle this issue, counsel for a more unified 
approach.59 Rhonda Gay Hartman calls for a “legal framework predicated 
on adolescent decisional ability” as a cure for inconsistent practices in the 
role adolescents have in choosing their own care.60 Legal recognition of 
minors’ status as autonomous beings worthy of protection has been 
acknowledged by the Supreme Court. Recognizing the dignity and 
personhood of minors, the Court has extended Bill of Rights protections to 
persons under the age of eighteen, holding they are entitled to be free from 
oppressive state action.61 Several opinions suggest that the Court recognizes 
rights of citizens under the age of eighteen beyond the right to be nurtured, 
protected, and educated.62 
 
54  GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF AUTONOMY 112 (1988) 
55  See George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 ORG. BEHAV. & 
HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 274 (1996) [http://perma.cc/3Z7C-VYTC]. 
56  Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 283 (1987) (citation omitted) (“[E]xpressed 
preference studies have shown that other (perceived) characteristics such as familiarity, control, . . . and 
level of knowledge also seem to influence the relation between perceived risk, perceived benefit, and 
risk acceptance.”) [http://perma.cc/6JJJ-ZMYJ]. 
57  Id. at 282–83 (example of psychometric data). 
58  Mutcherson, supra note 7, at 252. 
59  See id.; see also B. Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making by and on Behalf of Adolescents: 
Reconsidering First Principles, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 37, 72–73 (2012) 
[http://perma.cc/UXZ5-Z7F3]. 
60  Rhonda Gay Hartman, Adolescent Autonomy: Clarifying an Ageless Conundrum, 51 HASTINGS 
L.J. 1265, 1269 (2000). 
61  In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967) (“[N]either the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights 
is for adults alone.”) [http://perma.cc/GJ4Z-AK2E]. 
62  Id. The Court has also held that when persons under eighteen are prosecuted in the adult 
criminal justice system, they retain basic constitutional rights in those proceedings. See, e.g., In re 
Winship 397 U.S. 358, 368 (1970) (stating that minors are entitled to be found guilty “beyond a 
reasonable doubt”) [http://perma.cc/Y8F2-H5MM]; Gallegos v. Colorado, 370 U.S. 49, 54–55 (1962) 
(stating that a minor, without adult guidance, may not appreciate his constitutional rights before giving 
a confession) [http://perma.cc/TC4U-TLXU]; Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 601 (1948) (stating that 
“recitals which merely formalize constitutional requirements” do not sufficiently protect minors’ 
constitutional rights) [http://perma.cc/BQ8P-9CEC]. 
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III. ADULTS AND BIASED DECISIONMAKING 
Despite the strong justifications for parental control over an 
adolescent’s decisionmaking, there may be some reason to reevaluate the 
current parental decisionmaking model in health care settings. A growing 
volume of scholarship on decisional biases suggests that adults fall prey to 
biases that distort their decisionmaking.63 The term “bias” in psychology 
and decision theory refers to cognitive shortcuts that make storing, 
retrieving, and interpreting information faster and more efficient.64 While 
these shortcuts are often adaptive,65 they can lead to errors. Psychologists 
who study human behavior and judgment have identified numerous biases 
that could influence choice. The overoptimism bias, probability neglect, the 
availability heuristic, and the confirmation bias are several empirically 
demonstrated psychological phenomena that are particularly likely to be 
factors for parents and other adults who are faced with terminal illness in 
their child. These biases are robust, pervasive, and stubborn, and can lead 
to suboptimal decisionmaking. 
A. Overoptimism Bias 
Human beings are positive thinkers.66 When individuals make 
predictions about their future career, their children’s success, and the 
longevity of their own marriage, they vastly overestimate the likelihood of 
positive outcomes.67 The bias is highly adaptive; a positive outlook on life 
 
63  Articles in law reviews and journals in psychology, political science, economics, 
communication, business, medicine, ethics, and other disciplines have discussed the role of biases in 
criminal behavior, investing, public panics, environmental degradation, negotiation, public health, 
political participation, charging decisions and plea bargaining, risk assessment, and many, many other 
areas. See generally Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in Negotiation, 
20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 683 (2005); Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental 
Law, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 433 (2008) [http://perma.cc/D832-8MUA]; M.V. Rajeev Gowda, 
Heuristics, Biases, and the Regulation of Risk, 32 POL’Y SCI. 59 (1999); Molly J. Walker Wilson, 
Behavioral Decision Theory and Implications for the Supreme Court’s Campaign Finance 
Jurisprudence, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 679 (2010) [http://perma.cc/4SGK-CKSE]. 
64  See generally Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, in JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3 (Daniel Kahneman et al., 
eds., 1982) (first defining biases as irrational patterns of human decisionmaking). See also Jon D. 
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The Problem of Market Manipulation, 
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 633 (1999) (defining biases as “cognitive illusions”) [http://perma.cc/4SGK-
CKSE]. 
65  See generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q. J. ECON. 99 
(1955) (proposing that decisionmakers use shortcuts) [http://perma.cc/N6UY-2BT8]. 
66  See Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & 
SOC. PSYCHOL. 806, 806 (1980) (describing this phenomenon as “unrealistic optimism”) 
[http://perma.cc/X5FG-YNEQ]. 
67  See Neil D. Weinstein & William M. Klein, Unrealistic Optimism: Present and Future, 15 J. 
SOC. & CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1, 2 (1996) (emphasis omitted) (defining optimistic bias as the tendency to 
underestimate the “likelihood . . . of experiencing negative events”). For example, although estimated 
divorce rates hover between 35% and 50%, on their wedding day, couples tend to predict a zero chance 
of divorce. Lynn A. Baker & Robert E. Emery, When Every Relationship Is Above Average: 
Perceptions and Expectations of Divorce at the Time of Marriage, 17 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 439, 443 
(1993). 
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increases the likelihood of success.68 Optimism is also crucial for 
maintaining happiness.69 In spite of the protective effect of positive 
predictions, overoptimism can interfere with rational decisionmaking.70 
Unrealistic hopefulness can cause parents to choose for their children 
drastic, painful, and costly treatment options that are unlikely to help and 
may decrease quality of life. 
B. Probability Neglect 
The term “probability neglect” refers to the tendency of people to 
ignore known probabilities when making a decision.71 For example, when 
asked initially about the practice of wearing a seatbelt, respondents 
overwhelmingly judge seatbelts to increase the safety of the passenger of a 
car.72 However, when asked to think about being trapped in a car in an 
emergency, respondents devalue seatbelts, in spite of contradictory 
probabilistic data.73 Social scientists hypothesize that people fail to use 
probabilities in making decisions because statistics are abstract and seem 
disconnected from the real human problem that the decisionmaker 
confronts.74 From an evolutionary perspective, this makes sense. When the 
ancestors of modern humans were confronted with a charging lion, they 
had to rely upon gut intuitions. Probabilistic information was not available 
and following instinct was the best choice. 
For the parent with a critically ill child, maximizing good for the child 
may be eschewing the most aggressive treatment, or it may be not treating 
at all. The tendency of parents of an ill child to ignore or misinterpret a low 
probability of treatment success—particularly in tandem with the optimism 
bias—might lead a parent to reject the notion that a cure is unlikely. The 
parent, relying on an instinct to save his child, would then opt for the more 
aggressive form of treatment. 
C. Availability Heuristic 
When an event is cognitively available, people readily bring it to 
 
68  Tali Sharot, The Optimism Bias, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY R941, R944 (2011) 
[http://perma.cc/W6UD-RRST]. 
69  See generally Robert A. Cummins & Helen Nistico, Maintaining Life Satisfaction: The Role of 
Positive Cognitive Bias, 3 J. HAPPINESS STUD. 37 (2002). The group that is least likely to exhibit the 
overoptimism bias is the clinically depressed. See SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, POSITIVE ILLUSIONS: 
CREATIVE SELF-DECEPTION AND THE HEALTHY MIND 212–14 (1989). 
70  Cf. Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the Irrational Auditor: A Behavioral Insight into Securities 
Fraud Litigation, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 133, 152–56 (2000) (reviewing the negative effects of “undue 
optimism” on the rationality of auditors). 
71  Cass R. Sunstein, Probability Neglect: Emotions, Worst Cases, and Law, 112 YALE L.J. 61, 62–
63 (2002) [http://perma.cc/6Q73-WXAE]. 
72  Id. at 71. 
73  Id. 
74  Cf. Paul Slovic et al., The Affect Heuristic, in HEURISTICS AND BIASES, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF 
INTUITIVE JUDGMENT 401–03 (Thomas Gilovich et al. eds., 2002) (describing experiments in which 
subjects acted irrationally despite knowing probabilities of the possible outcomes). 
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mind, and as a result, judge it to be more common. Events become 
cognitively available when examples appear repeatedly, when the event or 
account is recent, or when the event is described using vivid language or 
images.75 A commonly cited example occurs when a commercial jet 
crashes.76 Because a large plane crash is considered newsworthy, it gets 
media attention. News accounts, along with photographs and descriptions 
of the event are broadcast and rebroadcast. Media outlets most often favor 
and choose images that are dramatic, vivid, and therefore particularly 
memorable. As a result, individuals overestimate the frequency of such 
crashes. This over-estimation translates to unreasonable attitudes about the 
risks posed by air travel. 
Tragedies are not the only stories that get reported widely. Miracle 
cures are also likely to get press. In 1989, a survey of medical reporters 
found that recently hired medical reporters overwhelmingly favored stories 
about new treatments and drugs over stories on issues related to access, 
ethics, or health care policy.77 As is true with all reporting, decisions about 
what to report and how to report it are made with the public’s interest (but 
not necessarily the public’s best interest) in mind.78 According to Dr. 
Arthur Caplan, director of the Center for Biomedical Ethics at the 
University of Minnesota, “You can stack up a mountain of tapes of stories 
on the recent Pittsburgh baboon-liver transplant.”79 Such stories are 
overrepresented in media outlets, and they focus on very rare events.80 
Miracles are newsworthy precisely because they are so unexpected. 
Parents of very ill children are highly motivated to find cures, and they 
often seek them out. For parents searching for treatments, these miracle 
stories are what is cognitively available. As a result, parents making 
decisions about a terminally ill child may have an unrealistic view of the 
likelihood of benefiting from novel or rare therapies. 
 
75  Molly J. Walker Wilson, The Expansion of Criminal Registries and the Illusion of Control, 
73 LA. L. REV. 509, 552 (2013) (“Research demonstrates that recent or frequent events, and events or 
depictions that are vivid or emotionally loaded, are particularly likely to become cognitively 
available.”) [http://perma.cc/368K-VPMR]. 
76  See, e.g., Molly J. Walker Wilson, A Behavioral Critique of Command-and-Control 
Environmental Regulation, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 223, 242 (2005) (citing Tversky & 
Kahneman, supra note 64, at 11). 
77  Gary J. Schwitzer, Doctoring the News: Miracle Cures, Video Press Releases and TV Medical 
Reporting, QUILL, Nov.–Dec., at 19, 20 (1992) [http://perma.cc/7YMR-W5PJ]. 
78  A study of the top newspapers and top medical journals concluded that carefully controlled 
studies were “too boring or incremental to get press coverage” and that “mainstream media prefer weak 
observational studies” with splashy headlines. Hank Campbell, Scare Journalism and Miracle Cures: 
American Media Prefer Weak Observational Studies, SCI. 2.0 (Jan. 24, 2014, 9:26 AM), 
http://www.science20.com/science_20/scare_journalism_and_miracle_cures_american_media_prefer_
weak_observational_studies-128393 (reporting on Senthil Selvaraj et al., Media Coverage of Medical 
Journals: Do the Best Articles Make the News?, 9 PLOS ONE 1 (2014) [http://perma.cc/FYD2-2JQP]) 
[http://perma.cc/52VA-ZDPJ]. 
79  Schwitzer, supra note 77, at 20. As Caplan notes, this story originally impacted one patient. Id. 
80  Id. 
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D. Confirmation Bias 
For parents caring for a critically ill child, the confirmation bias can 
work in tandem with both probability neglect and the availability heuristic 
to skew judgment and distort choice formation. The confirmation bias 
relates to the tendency of individuals to selectively look for information 
that supports a favored view.81 A commonly cited context in which this bias 
operates is in prosecutors’ charging decisions.82 When a prosecutor adopts a 
theory of how a crime occurred or focuses on a person of interest, he or she 
will often selectively look for evidence that confirms that theory. The 
related concept of “tunnel vision” explains how individuals often focus 
only on data that falls within the scope of the theory, both “seeing” that 
which supports the theory and not perceiving that which would tend to 
discredit it.83 
The confirmation bias has been demonstrated in empirical 
investigations of judgment and choice.84 One popular study format involves 
researchers testing the attitude of participants on various issues prior to 
exposing them to ambiguous or conflicting information. Following the 
presentation of the information, the researchers requestion the participants. 
Results of this study reveal that attitudes tend to be stronger after exposure 
to the information; participants appear to interpret the information in a way 
that is consistent with their prior beliefs—regardless of what those beliefs 
were.85 Findings supporting the existence of the confirmation bias are 
robust, and the bias is found in a wide range of decisionmaking contexts.86 
In medical settings, for example, patients have been shown to perceive a 
physician’s actions through the lens of this bias.87 
Other cognitive patterns likely interact with confirmation bias. For 
 
81  Alafair Burke, Neutralizing Cognitive Bias: An Invitation to Prosecutors, 2 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 512, 516–17 (2007) [http://perma.cc/TCM6-9ZMQ]. 
82  See, e.g., id. 
83  Id. at 517. 
84  Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in Many Guises, 2 REV. 
GEN. PSYCHOL. 175, 177 (1998) [http://perma.cc/Q4PG-695P]. 
85  In the late 1970s, researchers studied supporters and opponents of the death penalty. Pro- and 
anti-death penalty participants read a balanced essay that presented both evidence that capital 
punishment deters crime and evidence that it does not deter crime. The researchers then re-questioned 
the participants about their views. They found that participants in each group held their views even 
more strongly than they had prior to reading the essay. Apparently, they had interpreted the information 
they read in a way that was consistent with their preferred view. DANIEL GARDNER, THE SCIENCE OF 
FEAR: WHY WE FEAR THE THINGS WE SHOULDN’T—AND PUT OURSELVES IN GREATER DANGER 111 
(2008). 
86  See generally Stephanie Eckman & Frauke Kreuter, Confirmation Bias in Housing Unit Listing, 
75 PUB. OPINION Q. 139 (2011); Anna Harvey & Michael J. Woodruff, Confirmation Bias in the United 
States Supreme Court Judicial Database, 29 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 414 (2011) [http://perma.cc/K2QZ-
TPPJ]; Carole Hill et al., The Role of Confirmation Bias in Suspect Interviews: A Systematic 
Evaluation, 13 LEGAL & CRIMINOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 357 (2008); Franziska Tschan et al., Explicit 
Reasoning, Confirmation Bias, and Illusory Transactive Memory: A Simulation Study of Group Medical 
Decision Making, 40 SMALL GROUP RES. 271 (2009). 
87  Daniel Young, Curing What Ails Us: How the Lessons of Behavioral Economics Can Improve 
Health Care Markets, 30 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 461, 486 (2012) [http://perma.cc/K37C-BGX3]. 
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example, discounting negative probabilistic evidence is one form of tunnel 
vision. An actor who is motivated not to attend to disheartening statistical 
data is particularly likely to under-weigh this information when making a 
decision. The confirmation bias also influences behavior in ways that 
impact on cognitive availability. Searching for treatment options—and 
resulting success stories—increases exposure to this type of information, 
intensifying the cognitive availability and hence perceived efficacy of these 
options. In sum, the more cognitively available treatment success stories 
are, the easier it is to believe them to be common—or at least possible—a 
judgment that is bolstered by the motivation an individual has to believe 
that a cure could be a reality. 
E. Effects of Bias on Parental Decisionmaking 
The aforementioned biases can work together in the medical treatment 
context. Consider the following scenario. A parent has a child with a 
malignant brain stem glioma—an inoperable, invasive brain tumor. The 
sixteen-year-old child has resisted the recommended combination of 
chemo- and radiotherapies. As a result of the toxicity of the treatment, 
these therapies are quite difficult to endure. Without the therapies, the child 
will die. Even with the full range of possible therapies, the prognosis is 
quite poor. Oncologists have explained that the five-year survival rate 
hovers around fifteen percent. The parent’s preference is to try anything 
and everything to save the child. The child has repeatedly and forcefully 
opposed any treatment and has asked to return home to spend the brief time 
she has remaining with family. 
The parent starts with an overly optimistic outlook on her child’s 
prognosis. She has unrealistic expectations, even in the face of sobering 
information about the aggressiveness of the cancer. The treating 
oncologists have explained the prognosis in probabilistic terms. The parent 
understands the data as it was presented to her, but she does not give that 
information the weight it deserves when considering the options. In an 
effort to stay actively informed, and hoping that she might turn up novel 
therapies, the parent has spent many hours researching cures. Although 
much of her search has resulted in pessimistic accounts, through sheer 
effort and creative searches she has turned up several stories of patients 
with similar diagnoses miraculously recovering. She has bookmarked the 
Internet sites with miracle stories and has returned to them repeatedly. With 
each visit back to the sites, her sense of hope and her estimates of the 
chance of a cure increase. 
In a situation like the one described here, there is no single correct 
decision. For that matter, it is difficult to know what “most” people would 
choose. The parent’s instinct to save her child is understandable, even 
noble. The child’s desire not to suffer through painful, and likely 
ineffective, treatments is reasonable. On the one hand, it is the child’s body 
and life. She is the one who will suffer, either way. On the other hand, over 
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the years, the parent has made many choices about the child’s body—what 
she puts in it in terms of food, what activities she engages in, how she is 
dressed on a cold day, and how she stays hydrated on a hot one. Few in our 
society would question the wisdom of giving the parent control over these 
decisions for her children—even when the child occasionally opposes a 
parental decision. When a fit, loving parent makes an informed decision 
about her minor child, it seems presumptively correct. But there are 
features of the terminally ill child context that suggest that this presumption 
at least be questioned. 
IV. A PROPOSAL FOR FAMILY DECISIONMAKING 
Hospitals and health care providers routinely include parent 
preferences in decisions about the appropriate treatment.88 Studies of 
parent–physician interactions reveal that parents often influence treatment 
proposals, even when a provider is not conscious of the extent to which the 
parent is exerting influence.89 Frequently, the assumption is that, for an 
older child, the parent’s decision is informed at least in part by the wishes 
of the child. In cases where the wishes of the parent and the child diverge, 
the question is whether there is a viable alternative to traditional deference 
to the parent. For a variety of reasons discussed in Parts I and II of this 
Essay and articulated by the Supreme Court on several occasions,90 parents 
should retain some measure of control over treatment choices. However, 
respect for the parent can coexist with involvement of the child in the 
decisionmaking process, and, as discussed earlier, there are important 
reasons why an older minor should have a significant voice in the course of 
treatment. 
A better model can be found by looking at recent hospital innovations 
in dealing with the ethical issues that arise from difficult healthcare 
decisions. Ethical considerations have become increasingly salient in the 
acute care context, both because new technologies have increased the 
potential for prolonging life, and also because of cases like Cruzan v. 
 
88  For example, the Children’s Hospital of Wisconsin has a website explaining that: 
Specific treatment for brain tumors will be determined by your child’s physician based on: 
• Your child’s age, overall health and medical history. 
• Type, location, and size of the tumor. 
• Extent of the disease. 
• Your child’s tolerance for specific medications, procedures or therapies. 
• Expectations for the course of the disease. 
• Your opinion or preference. 
Brain Tumors, CHILD. HOSP. OF WIS. (emphasis added), http://www.chw.org/medical-care/macc-fund-
center/conditions/oncology/brain-tumors (last visited Mar. 16, 2015) [http://perma.cc/7PVD-GTU7]. 
Note that there is no mention of the child’s opinion or preference. In light of the current state of the law, 
this is altogether typical and proper. 
89  Tanya Stivers, Parent Resistance to Physicians’ Treatment Recommendations: One Resource 
for Initiating a Negotiation of the Treatment Decision, 18 HEALTH COMM., 41, 67–68 (2005) 
[http://perma.cc/6W5Y-F32Z]. 
90  See supra Part I. 
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Director, Missouri Department of Health.91 Faced with complex legal and 
ethical situations involving terminal patients in a variety of situations, 
hospitals have instituted ethics committees to consult in difficult cases. 
Nancy Dubler and Leonard Marcus write: “[The] recognition that thorny 
ethical issues are sometimes best tackled from within has left hospitals, 
long-term care facilities, and some home care agencies to create ethics 
committees or hire ethics consultants.”92 Committees, however, spend a 
significant amount of time not in case consultation, but in developing and 
evaluating hospital policy.93 As a result, they may not be ideally situated to 
meet the needs of the individual patients and families. 
In lieu of a committee, a bioethical mediator, whether operating under 
the nomenclature “ethical consultant” or “clinical ethicist,”94 can provide a 
bridge between parties who disagree and can help individuals to recognize 
the exogenous factors that might be affecting their preferences.95 When an 
adolescent has a preference that is different from her parents, a bioethical 
mediator can help the child and the parents reach a compromise that is 
acceptable for all parties. Alternatively, a mediator can provide an 
objective perspective and, properly trained, can assess the biases that are 
influencing preferences. 
When a child is facing life-threatening illness or injury, a bioethical 
mediator can help to manage a number of competing considerations. One is 
to keep parents comforted and engaged. Parents contemplating the end of 
their child’s life are already in a state of emotional turmoil. Heavy-handed 
interference by medical professionals or state actors who threaten to further 
strip them of control where their child is concerned will do more harm than 
good. Without parental support, a child is less likely to thrive under optimal 
circumstances, to say nothing about when the child’s health is seriously 
compromised.96 Moreover, the child who is at the center of conflict will 
 
91  Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health 497 U.S. 261 (1990) [http://perma.cc/5TVT-WBEN]. In 
Cruzan, the Court held that competent persons have a Fourteenth Amendment liberty interest in 
refusing any and all medical treatments. Id. at 278. However, the Court also indicated that an 
“incompetent” patient may not have the same right to refuse treatment because of the lack of informed 
consent, but surrogates may be empowered to make such decisions for patients. Id. at 280. The Court 
ruled that particular family members need not automatically become authorized surrogates; instead, 
states can impose their own requirements for surrogacy. Id. at 285–87. Another well-known case that 
preceded Cruzan was In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976) [https://perma.cc/LG3E-VTL2], in 
which the parents of Karen Quinlan, a young woman who was in a persistent vegetative state, went to 
court to be permitted to remove artificial life-sustaining treatment. In 1976, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court ruled in the family’s favor. 
92  NANCY NEVELOFF DUBLER & LEONARD J. MARCUS, MEDIATING BIOETHICAL DISPUTES: A 
PRACTICAL GUIDE 4 (1994). 
93  Cf. Gail J. Povar, Evaluating Ethics Committees: What Do We Mean by Success?, 50 MD. L. 
REV. 904, 908 (1991) (“Numerous authors have envisioned policy generation as one of the more 
important tasks of institutional ethics committees.”) [http://perma.cc/WCJ4-ERBK]. 
94  Dubler & Marcus, supra note 92, at 7. 
95  Id. 
96  Cf. Jianghong Li et al., Parents’ Nonstandard Work Schedules and Child Well-Being: A Critical 
Review of the Literature, 35 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 53, 57 (2003) (“Attachment, psychoanalytic, and 
family theorists have emphasized the importance of the parent–child relationship in developing 
children’s trust and a sense of identity. . . .”). 
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experience psychic distress, and this can further exacerbate her medical 
condition. If the child’s wish to forego particular treatments is at the heart 
of the conflict, intervening between the parent and the child might damage 
the relationship and result in feelings of resentment in the parents and guilt 
in the child. Furthermore, parents who are losing their child to illness may 
exhibit predictable patterns of bias discussed previously that cloud their 
judgment. Irrational thinking can be particularly strong for individuals who 
are facing devastating outcomes. The prevalence of these biases is more 
pronounced when considered along with the stages-of-grief model 
developed in 1969 by clinical psychologist Elisabeth Kübler-Ross.97 The 
first state of grief experienced by parents facing the death of a child is 
denial.98 Overly optimistic expectations about the potential for 
improvement and selective searches for information that confirms a hopeful 
prognosis are fundamental aspects of the denial stage. For parents who are 
making decisions while in this stage of coping, a genuine desire to make 
the best decision for the child is often not sufficient to overcome the 
cognitive and emotional roadblocks. Bioethical mediators are well-situated 
to track and address each of these potential dilemmas. 
Ultimately, the best decisions will be made in a cooperative 
environment, where biases and irrationalities can be kept in check by 
countervailing perspectives. Where there is conflict between the wishes of 
the two parents or between the wishes of the parents and those of the child, 
a trained bioethical mediator can help guide the parties toward a 
resolution.99 Bioethical mediators can, in many instances, help the parties to 
avoid conflict altogether by maintaining open communication and helping 
the patient and family members to suspend judgment while the perspectives 
of each individual are explored.100 As one commentator has put it, 
“Mediation can help clarify: the interests and rights of the parties; the 
issues on which the parties disagree; and a resolution that respects the best 
interest of the patient and the integrity of the provider.”101 A successful 
mediator is neutral and trained to recognize the biases mentioned in this 
 
97  See D. Christian Addicott, Regulating Research on the Terminally Ill: A Proposal for 
Heightened Safeguards, 15 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 479, 497–99 (1999) 
[http://perma.cc/4JF7-LSWE]. Elisabeth Kübler-Ross argued in her seminal work, On Death and 
Dying, that patients progress through a series of six set stages: first shock, then denial, anger, 
bargaining, depression, and finally acceptance. See generally ELISABETH KÜBLER-ROSS, ON DEATH 
AND DYING (1969). 
98  Cf. Kübler-Ross, supra note 97, at 34–43. 
99  Bioethics mediators are trained to understand the issue that face patients and to help the patient 
and family members communicate clearly desires and concerns. 
100  One lawyer who has represented patients remarked, “If we had been better communicators, or 
if a bioethics mediator had been called in instead of the hospital lawyer and then a 
judge . . .[we] . . .would have explored what Mrs. P’s true interests were and what she was trying to 
communicate when she took the no-injection position.” Carol B. Liebman, Introduction to the 
Symposium Issue on Alternative Dispute Resolution Strategies in End-of-Life Decisions, 23 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 3 (2007). 
101  Using Mediation for Bioethical Dilemmas, 13 ALTERNATIVES TO THE HIGH COST OF LITIG. 
159, 159 (1995). 
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Essay as well as other biases that might be influencing the parties. By 
gently probing the bases for parents’ and adolescents’ attitudes and 
preferences, the mediator can encourage recognition of unrealistic 
assumptions that may be the sources of disagreement. When all parties 
have a clearer sense for the costs and benefits of various treatment options, 
there is greater opportunity for the parents and child to engage in an 
informed and productive discussion. 
CONCLUSION 
When it comes to treatment options for critically ill adolescents, the 
wishes of the mature minor may or may not be respected. Until a child 
reaches the age of eighteen, her parents are the presumptive 
decisionmakers. There are good reasons for parental deference. Some of 
these reasons are historical, some are based upon Supreme Court precedent 
and parental rights, and some relate to incomplete cognitive development 
of older minors. Nevertheless, if the goal is to promote good 
decisionmaking, an adolescent patient should have a role in deciding on 
treatment. This Essay has argued that the existing singular focus on the 
limits of adolescents’ capacity is misplaced; it has also suggested that 
biases can influence parents’ choices. Several biases described in the Essay 
suggest in particular that parents may push for aggressive therapies that are 
unlikely to be efficacious in light of medical evidence. Particularly in 
situations where the child prefers to forego these treatments, this choice 
may ultimately be optimal for the child. 
Where the wishes of the parents and child diverge, a bioethical 
mediator can serve an important role, helping the family reach a decision 
that is comfortable for everyone. A successful mediator will identify the 
limitations of each individual involved, while also acknowledging the 
important roles of both adolescent and parents. When it comes to selecting 
among treatment options for a critically ill adolescent, there is often no 
single, obviously correct choice. Including parents’ and adolescents’ 
perspectives regarding treatment improves the decisionmaking process, 
while simultaneously legitimizing the vital role that each individual has in 
the ultimate outcome. 
 
